For decades, Jordan has been a cornerstone of regional stability for the United States. For American policymakers in general, the Kingdom is viewed as a reliable security partner, a pragmatic mediator, and a moderate voice in a highly polarized region. However, this cohesive external role coincides with increasing internal pressures, presenting Jordanian policymakers with a delicate equation: how to maintain the strategic partnership with the United States without jeopardizing domestic equilibrium?

 

First: A more sensitive domestic environment. Jordan faces a complex set of internal pressures, which can be summarized in three main areas: economic pressures, high public debt, unemployment, especially among youth, and slowing economic growth, all of which fuel public frustration. Despite reform programs implemented in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, large segments of the population still feel that the benefits of reform are not directly reflected in their daily lives.

 

The political transformations initiated by King Abdullah II are a path toward modernizing the political system through new election and party laws, aiming to enhance party participation and develop parliamentary life. However, these reforms are proceeding gradually and cautiously, creating a gap between the aspirations of some political forces and the state's cautious approach.

 

Public opinion regarding the Palestinian issue is a highly sensitive element within Jordan, given the demographic and historical ties. With every escalation in the West Bank or Gaza, popular pressure intensifies for a firmer stance toward Israel, which is directly reflected in domestic political discourse.

 

These factors combined make the domestic environment more sensitive to any decision perceived as being entirely aligned with Washington or inconsistent with public sentiment.

 

Second: The importance of the relationship with Washington. Despite these pressures, the relationship with the United States remains a cornerstone of Jordan’s national strategy. This relationship rests on three main pillars: direct economic support, with the United States being Jordan’s largest bilateral donor, providing the Kingdom with the necessary financial buffer to maintain its economic and social stability; military and security cooperation, with Jordan being a pivotal partner in combating terrorism and securing its borders, particularly in light of the challenges emanating from Syria and Iraq; and the Kingdom hosting US military bases and facilities that enhance operational coordination; and regional political coordination, which plays a pivotal role, with Washington relying on Amman on sensitive issues, from managing escalation in the West Bank to broader regional arrangements.

 

For Jordan, this relationship is not a tactical choice, but rather a structural element of its national security system.

 

Third: Tools for managing balance. Managing this apparent contradiction between domestic and foreign policy is not achieved through a single discourse, but rather through a combination of carefully considered policies, including: separating rhetoric from policy. Jordan sometimes adopts a firm political stance domestically, particularly on issues related to Jerusalem or violations in the West Bank, to absorb public anger. This separation allows for managing public opinion without compromising strategic pillars.

 

Enhancing the image of an independent mediator. Jordan seeks to present itself to Washington not as a subordinate party, but as an independent actor holding the keys to stability. When Amman publicly criticizes Israeli policies, it justifies this to its American partners as necessary for maintaining internal stability and preventing escalation. In this way, firm positions become an element that serves common interests rather than threatens them.

 

Utilizing political reform as a safety valve. By opening the door to broader party representation, including forces with Islamist or opposition orientations, the state seeks to contain protest movements within the institutional framework. This approach reduces the likelihood of discontent spilling onto the streets in an uncontrolled manner and gives the regime greater capacity to absorb pressures without radical changes. Diversifying Partnerships without Breaking the Alliance: Despite the centrality of its relationship with the United States, Jordan has worked in recent years to expand its network of regional and international relations, whether by deepening cooperation with the Gulf states or opening up to other international powers. However, this diversification has not reached the point of a strategic repositioning, but rather has remained within limits that do not weaken the alliance with Washington.

 

Fourth: Limits of maneuvering. Nevertheless, Jordan's ability to manage this balance is not unlimited. Three factors could restrict its room for maneuver in the future:

 

A widening gap between public opinion and official policy: If regional crises escalate without political solutions, it may become difficult to continue separating rhetoric from policy.

 

A decline in external economic support: Any significant reduction in US aid could put pressure on internal stability and weaken the ability to absorb crises.

 

A shift in US policy: Washington's priorities may change, or its preoccupation with other issues may diminish Jordan's centrality in US calculations, prompting Amman to reassess some of its options.

 

Fifth: The equation of conditional stability. In short, Jordan is not managing a contradiction so much as it is managing an equation of “conditional stability.” Internal stability requires a political and economic margin provided by the partnership with the United States, while the sustainability of this partnership depends on the state’s ability to maintain its internal cohesion. This equation explains the Jordanian approach, which is based on pragmatism and flexibility rather than ideological alignment. The Kingdom is not seeking to redefine its alliance with Washington, but rather to constantly recalibrate it in accordance with internal and regional transformations. For policymakers in Washington, the fundamental lesson lies in recognizing that solely the depth of military cooperation or the volume of aid, but does not measure the strength of the partnership with Jordan also by the degree of understanding of the internal complexities that govern Amman’s decisions. Supporting Jordanian stability—economically and politically—serves not only the Kingdom but also strengthens one of the most important pillars of the regional order that the United States has sought to establish. This has been consolidated over the past decades.

 

Finally, in a changing Middle Eastern environment characterized by shifting alliances and escalating asymmetric conflicts, Jordan will remain a cautious player, preferring risk management to confrontational, albeit drastic, choices. The Kingdom understands that any ill-considered alignment could directly affect its politically and economically sensitive domestic front. Therefore, Amman continues to balance containing popular pressures with maintaining strategic coordination channels with its partners, foremost among them Washington. This approach, based on gradual pragmatism, not only grants Jordan greater room for maneuver but also reinforces its image as a reliable partner in a highly uncertain regional environment.

 

Hasan Al-Dajah - Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University