The issue is no longer who Donald Trump is negotiating with inside Iran, but the fact that the question itself has become part of the battle. When he announces the existence of a “strong” Iranian figure without revealing their identity, under the pretext of protecting them, he is not offering information, he is planting suspicion within the structure of power and triggering a silent struggle over who holds the authority to negotiate and who falls under suspicion.

 

Quickly, Israeli media leaks pushed the name of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to the forefront as the possible interlocutor. Despite official Iranian denials, the accumulation of signals from regional mediation channels, to requests not to target specific individuals, to hints by Abbas Araghchi about delaying a response suggests that a real negotiating track is moving quietly in the background.

 

Yet the real significance of this track lies not in its substance, but in its internal impact. The mere suggestion that Washington has a “trusted partner” within the Iranian system redistributes doubt across the power structure and opens a silent contest over legitimacy and decision-making authority. In this sense, the statement becomes an instrument of soft dismantling, undermining internal cohesion while simultaneously opening a window outward.

 

In parallel, Trump continues to calibrate the rhythm of war through a different logic: ceasefires are not de-escalation, but tools. They provide political cover and help manage energy markets, yet on the ground they coincide with an intensification of precision strikes deep inside Iran targeting military, industrial, and scientific infrastructure, including the core of the nuclear program. This is a war managed on dual tracks; restraint in rhetoric and escalation in action.

 

Regionally, as Iran’s ballistic capabilities erode, Hezbollah emerges as the most relatively effective pressure card, while Iraqi militia factions have been largely neutralized. As for Tehran’s attempts to activate its remaining fronts, most notably the Houthis, they appear less like a strategy capable of altering the course of conflict and more like an effort to preserve the image of influence.

 

The Houthi front, despite being inserted into the equation, has lost much of its sustainability. Strikes targeting its leadership structure and missile capabilities have pushed it toward survival calculations rather than escalation. Any move to threaten the Bab el-Mandeb would place it in direct confrontation with international power, a fundamentally asymmetric equation. With diminished Iranian support, its role is reduced to symbolic actions with media impact rather than decisive military effect.

 

Still, the most dangerous shift lies in the possibility that Iran may move toward a strategy of “collective damage” targeting the Gulf arena or activating non-conventional tools such as sleeper cells and expanded drone operations. At that point, the threat level moves beyond missiles and drones into fragmented, ground-level chaos where the rules of engagement begin to dissolve.

 

At the same time, as American and Israeli strikes deepen, Washington is preparing for a more sensitive phase centered on the Strait of Hormuz. The objective is not a direct closure, but the creation of a high-risk maritime environment through indirect targeting, pushing insurance companies to withdraw and turning passage into an open gamble. The focus thus shifts toward Iran’s coastal capabilities, launch platforms, and the use of unconventional maritime tools to neutralize threats.

 

As for the deadline Trump has set before expanding strikes to Iran’s energy infrastructure and power grid, it is less an ultimatum than a mechanism for accelerating escalation to its maximum threshold. It creates conditions in which the cost of de-escalation becomes higher than the cost of continuation for the Iranian system.

 

In essence, what is unfolding is not the military overthrow of the Iranian regime in a single blow, but its gradual erosion under the pressure of a newly imposed internal reality. It is a war not aimed at a moment of collapse, but at reaching a point beyond which reversal is no longer possible.

 

At that precise point, the question will no longer be who Washington is negotiating with but who remains in Tehran capable of making the decision to negotiate at all.