Sometimes wars are not decided solely by military power, but by the strategy through which they are managed. This helps explain why the U.S. administration insists that what is taking place in Iran is not a conventional war, but a deeper operation known as “Epic Fury.”

 

From the outset, it was clear that the operation followed a multi-phase strategy. It began by targeting the leadership structure of the Iranian regime through precise intelligence and military operations. This was followed by efforts to strip the regime of its defensive capabilities and establish effective control over Iranian airspace, before expanding strikes to include military assets and critical infrastructure.

 

The most sensitive phase emerged when operations began targeting the regime’s internal instruments of control, particularly the mechanisms used to enforce authority within society. Headquarters of the Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with key security facilities, were struck. This reflects the trajectory described by President Donald Trump when he framed the operation as an effort to “create the conditions for the Iranian people to bring about change.”

 

Within this context, the confrontation increasingly resembles a strategy aimed at forcing the regime into submission. After targeting military capabilities, pressure shifted inward by complicating the regime’s ability to manage the state and its economy. This dynamic is particularly visible in discussions about controlling Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export hub, a move that would deprive the regime of one of its most important economic lifelines.

 

On the other side, Iran’s response quickly revealed the severity of the initial blow. The absence of clear leadership forced the Revolutionary Guard to move rapidly to contain the vacuum, maintaining the position of the Supreme Leader in a state of deliberate ambiguity—a leader heard about but rarely seen—to prevent the emergence of alternative centers of power.

 

Under these circumstances, Tehran appeared to shift toward regional escalation. Instead of relying solely on direct retaliation, Iran adopted an approach aimed at spreading instability across the Gulf in order to demonstrate its ability to threaten global energy and financial centers.

 

It also hinted at the possibility of disrupting international navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, seeking to raise the cost of the conflict for the international community. Yet these moves prompted widespread condemnation and renewed efforts to secure international shipping lanes.

 

Even the threat of pushing oil prices to $200 per barrel failed to produce the intended effect after President Trump authorized the release of the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, helping stabilize global markets.

 

The involvement of Hezbollah and Iraqi militias reinforced the impression that Iran was attempting to use its remaining regional cards, activating instability as a last resort.

 

Washington and Israel, however, have largely responded through a managed containment strategy, treating the confrontation as a limited war of endurance rather than an open-ended conflict.

 

Two weeks into the operation, three scenarios appear to face Washington: continuing military and political pressure until Tehran accepts imposed terms; halting operations once internal instability deepens within the regime; or delivering a decisive strike that would allow Washington to declare a clear victory.

 

What appears increasingly evident, however, is that the United States and Israel may not be seeking a limited tactical success, but rather a full strategic victory. The trajectory that began more than two years ago is unlikely to conclude without closing several regional fronts—foremost among them Iran—alongside weakening militia networks in Iraq and neutralizing Hezbollah’s threat in Lebanon.

 

For this reason, Washington and Israel appear to be operating under a parallel-front strategy: weakening the Iranian regime internally, striking militia networks in Iraq, and addressing Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon.

 

In Washington’s view, many of these groups have gradually become a burden on the states in which they operate and an even greater burden on their own social environments, making the prospect of confronting them less costly than in the past.