Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian military operation, a fundamental question has resurfaced in global strategic debate: Who truly benefits from weakening Europe economically and depriving it of cheap Russian energy sources, which for decades constituted one of the most important elements of its industrial competitiveness? Is what has happened merely a natural consequence of the conflict with Russia, or is it part of a broader process of restructuring the balance of power within the Western camp itself?

 

Historically, Western Europe has relied on a simple strategic equation: American security through NATO, low-cost Russian energy, and open global markets for European exports. This equation enabled Europe for decades to achieve high growth rates, especially in Germany, which built its industrial strength on cheap Russian gas, advanced technology, and open trade.

 

However, the military operation in Ukraine has turned this equation on its head. Europe lost a significant portion of its Russian gas and oil imports and was forced to import energy from more distant and expensive markets. This led to higher production costs, inflation, and a decline in the competitiveness of European industry. Meanwhile, some major European companies began relocating their investments to the United States to take advantage of lower energy prices and generous government incentives.

 

From the perspective of the realist school of international relations, major powers do not act solely out of friendship or moral alliances, but rather according to calculations of power and self-interest. In this context, several analysts within the realist school of international relations believe that the United States views Europe as a key strategic ally, but at the same time, it cautiously monitors any developments that might grant the European Union significant economic or strategic independence, which could diminish American influence within the Western system. The greater Europe's economic power and strategic independence, the less capable the United States becomes of leading the Western system unilaterally.

 

This explains the eagerness of successive US administrations to maintain Europe's security dependence on the American umbrella. Security is the key that grants Washington lasting influence over European strategic decisions. As the perception of a Russian threat intensified, European capitals became increasingly reliant on the United States politically, militarily, and in terms of intelligence.

 

Regarding Ukraine and NATO, Moscow views the alliance's eastward expansion as a direct threat to its national security and an infringement upon its historical strategic depth. Russia bases its position on a series of political statements and understandings that followed the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which it believes included Western promises not to expand the alliance toward its borders. From this perspective, Moscow considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO a transgression of Russia's security "red lines." Conversely, the United States and NATO members assert that the principle of state sovereignty grants Ukraine the full right to choose its alliances and security partnerships, and that no legally binding agreement prohibits NATO expansion. Caught between these two opposing viewpoints, Ukraine has become a focal point in a broader struggle over the future of European security and the balance of power in the international system.

 

But beyond the legal debate, the strategic outcome was clear: Europe became a protracted arena of confrontation between Russia and the West. The longer the war dragged on, the higher Europe's military spending bill became, energy costs soared, and economic growth slowed.

 

On the economic front, the United States benefited from several concurrent developments. Its exports of liquefied natural gas to Europe surged to unprecedented levels. The European energy crisis and the stimulus provided by the US anti-inflation law prompted a number of European companies to expand or redirect some of their industrial investments toward the United States, particularly in the electric vehicle, battery, and clean technology sectors. This sparked a broad debate within the European Union about the risks of declining European industrial competitiveness. Furthermore, European demand for American weapons, air defense systems, and military equipment increased.

 

The ongoing tension between Europe and Russia also limits the prospects of a massive Eurasian economic axis combining European technology, Russian resources, and Asian markets—a scenario that has long worried some American strategists who believe that any significant rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow could create a geopolitical bloc capable of counterbalancing American global influence.

 

Perhaps the most important issue lies in the transformations underway within the international system itself. The world is witnessing a gradual shift from unipolarity to a more complex multipolarity, with the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the growing influence of other regional powers. In this new environment, the United States seeks to maintain its leadership position by realigning alliances, redirecting resources, and preventing the emergence of independent power centers within the Western camp.

 

However, talk of an “American conspiracy to weaken Europe” may be an oversimplification of reality. The transatlantic relationship remains based on a broad network of shared economic, military, and political interests. What is clear, however, is that American priorities do not always align with European interests, and that Europe has borne a greater cost than the United States in confronting Russia.

 

Europe finds itself facing a crucial historical question: Will it continue to rely on the American umbrella as the primary guarantor of its security, or will it move towards building genuine strategic independence that balances its economic interests with its security requirements? The answer to this question will not only determine the future of Europe, but may also shape the international order in the coming decades, in a world rapidly moving towards multipolarity and competition among major powers to reshape maps of influence, wealth, and power.

 

Hasan Dajah is professor of strategic studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University