It is still premature—indeed analytically and politically hasty—to leap to the question of the “day after” this war. The situation has yet to settle into a clear equation, and the lines of confrontation remain open to a wide spectrum of scenarios, ranging from fragile containment through a limited ceasefire to further escalation into a broader regional conflict. In this context, the prospect of near-term understandings—based on the anticipated or ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran—appears unlikely, not only due to the absence of trust, but also because the structural gap between the two sides remains deep and widening.

 

Yet, there is a paradox worth noting: both the American and Iranian sides—unlike Benjamin Netanyahu—seek to end the war, though not at any cost. Each is searching for a “narrative equilibrium,” a position from which it can market the outcome domestically and internationally as neither outright victory nor total defeat, but rather as a politically interpretable middle ground. This grey zone, in essence, is what Donald Trump has been seeking—albeit in a simplified form based on claiming a “major victory” that can be sold to the American public.

 

In Tehran, it appears that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—which has effectively steered decision-making during this war—has approached the conflict as an existential struggle in the literal sense. The objective has not been to achieve a conventional military victory, but rather to prevent sudden regime collapse and to maximize the cost of war—regionally, economically, and politically—not only for the United States but for the entire regional environment.

 

However, this strategy is now approaching its limits. As the war continues, doubts are growing within Iranian circles about the ability to sustain missile stockpiles and continue delivering impactful strikes, especially amid increasing indications of a potential international coalition to secure the Strait of Hormuz—an escalation that would widen and intensify the conflict. Consequently, the IRGC’s preferred outcome is no longer “victory,” but rather exiting the war without a clear defeat. Survival itself—preventing regime change—becomes a form of implicit victory in the context of asymmetric power dynamics.

 

On the other side, Donald Trump faces a more complex equation than it may appear. While prolonging the war could offer an opportunity to further weaken Iran and extract greater gains, the economic costs—particularly for U.S. stock markets—and the impact on public opinion impose important constraints. This complexity is compounded by the presence of an influential faction within his inner circle that opposed the war from the outset, led by Vice President J.D. Vance, alongside figures such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, in contrast to a more hawkish camp within the administration.

 

Within this internal balance, reaching an understanding with Iran becomes a “reasonable” option for Trump, even if not ideal. Drawing on his political and media instincts, he remains capable of reframing any agreement as a major victory—even if, in substance, it is closer to a negotiated compromise. This ability to “redefine outcomes” constitutes one of Trump’s key strengths in handling international crises.

 

Conversely, Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be the only actor who does not view ending the war at this stage as strategically desirable. For him, this represents a rare historical opportunity to reshape the regional security environment fundamentally. The problem, from his perspective, is not limited to Iran’s current behavior, but extends to the nature of the regime itself and its accumulated scientific and technical expertise, which would enable it to rebuild its nuclear and missile programs even if they were completely destroyed.

 

Nevertheless, translating these conflicting strategic intentions into a mutually acceptable deal remains far from straightforward. The gap between Washington and Tehran is not merely technical, but deeply political and strategic. The United States is not only concerned with uranium enrichment, but also seeks to freeze Iran’s missile program, impose stricter oversight, and dismantle its regional network of influence. In contrast, Tehran views these demands as undermining the very core of the regime and its legitimacy, and insists on sanctions relief, compensation, and security guarantees—demands that are difficult for a Trump administration to fully accommodate.

 

The situation becomes even more complex with the issue of Hezbollah, which may emerge as the most intractable obstacle in any future negotiations. Iran is likely to insist on linking the two arenas, while Israel will treat this as a red line, particularly given the growing conviction within Israeli military circles of the necessity of resolving the Hezbollah file, even independently of Iran’s fate.

 

In light of all this, possibilities remain open, scenarios multiple, and any negotiations—if they begin—will likely prove more complex than the Geneva talks that preceded the war. Although the chances of a comprehensive settlement remain limited, two factors may still push toward the search for a “middle island”: Trump’s volatility and willingness to reposition himself on the one hand, and Iran’s existential need to exit this strategic impasse on the other.