US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently responded to a question from a member of the U.S. Senate regarding media reports about American-Israeli plans to weaken, and ultimately abolish, the Hashemite custodianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. Rubio claimed he knew nothing about such plans and expressed surprise at the question, while emphasizing that relations between the United States and Jordan remain excellent.
Whether Rubio’s answer was genuine—meaning that he is genuinely unaware of plans that may be discussed elsewhere within political circles—or whether he was simply evading the question, the reports leaked by several sources regarding American-Israeli efforts to alter the status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque and weaken the Hashemite custodianship are highly consistent with realities on the ground and with long-standing Israeli policies. These reports reinforce the growing conviction that Israel enjoys a green light from Washington to continue advancing this agenda.
Those who believe that a genuine American veto exists against Israeli measures are mistaken. Rubio’s remarks should not be celebrated as evidence of restraint imposed on Netanyahu’s government, nor should they be treated as a definitive refutation of the reports in question. Rather, they represent another attempt to obscure reality and ignore the openly declared Israeli policies aimed at Judaizing Jerusalem and transforming the existing status quo.
These policies are neither hidden nor speculative. They are reflected in budgets approved by the Knesset for land acquisition projects, settlement expansion and strategic infrastructure schemes, including the well-known E1 project, which would effectively divide the West Bank into two major geographical sections.
The significance of the recent reports lies in their explicit reference to the Hashemite custodianship. Yet an important question remains: what exactly is the value of this custodianship? Does it extend beyond the day-to-day administrative and service functions within Al-Aqsa Mosque?
Many observers fail to appreciate the historical, political and strategic dimensions of the custodianship. Its foundations are rooted in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and were subsequently reinforced by a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement affirming the Hashemite role in protecting Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.
Its significance extends far beyond administrative responsibilities. It serves as a mechanism for safeguarding the holy sites themselves. Jordan occupies a historically recognized role in Jerusalem and has, for decades—particularly since the signing of the peace treaty—acted as both monitor and negotiator in efforts to preserve the status quo. Daily reports issued by Jordan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs document Israeli violations and changes on the ground. Diplomatic channels, both public and private, have continuously been employed to address developments concerning Jerusalem’s holy sites.
Despite repeated Israeli attempts to advance their plans, Jordanian diplomacy has consistently treated Jerusalem as a matter of core national priority. From Israel’s perspective, removing the Hashemite custodianship would provide far greater freedom of action inside Al-Aqsa Mosque and facilitate a gradual transformation of the existing reality there, much as has occurred—and continues to occur—at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.
According to the leaked American-Israeli document cited in media reports, part of this agenda involves removing the administration of Jerusalem’s Islamic endowments (Awqaf) from Jordanian authority and placing them under alternative control. Such a development would effectively eliminate one of the most important mechanisms of oversight and accountability.
As for the Trump administration, it is important to recognize that its disagreement with Israel is neither about annexation nor about control over Jerusalem. During Trump’s first term, the US embassy was moved to Jerusalem, signaling a fundamental shift in American policy. The difference lies elsewhere: in the method rather than the objective. Washington’s preference is to proceed quietly and strategically, avoiding unnecessary confrontation with friendly Arab governments and regional allies.
What may be even more consequential is the broader political context. Trump’s difficulties in dealing with Iran, the increasingly public disagreements between him and Benjamin Netanyahu, and his insistence on preventing Israeli escalation in Lebanon have all created new pressures within the relationship.
Under such circumstances, the files of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza become among the few remaining areas through which Trump can compensate his difficult ally. In practice, Israel has already been granted considerable freedom of action in these arenas. Netanyahu, facing future electoral battles and seeking to satisfy his Religious Zionist partners, is likely to pursue major political rewards in Jerusalem and the West Bank.
This makes Jerusalem and the West Bank the most likely arena for the region’s next major political confrontation. If Washington succeeds in neutralizing Iran and weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” the central struggle will increasingly shift toward Jerusalem and the occupied territories. In that sense, these issues represent both a pillar of continuity in the Trump-Netanyahu relationship and a political lifeline for Netanyahu’s own future.
For that reason, Rubio’s statements should not distract observers from what is taking place on the ground. Political realities are ultimately shaped not by public denials but by facts, policies, and cumulative developments. And on that front, the signs are increasingly difficult to ignore.