Israel’s forthcoming elections are being viewed as one of the most consequential political moments in recent decades—not only because they could bring Benjamin Netanyahu’s long era to an end, but because Netanyahu has come to embody an entire period of conflicts, divisions and wars that followed October 7, 2023.

 

At first glance, the electoral map looks more like a contest between Netanyahu and his opponents than a confrontation between two coherent political projects. An alliance has emerged between Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, while Gadi Eisenkot leads another list, alongside other opposition forces united primarily by the goal of ending Netanyahu’s rule. On the other side stand Likud and its religious-nationalist and Haredi allies. Yet the differences within the anti-Netanyahu camp are considerable and could become much more apparent if it actually succeeds in taking power.

 

The significance of these elections extends well beyond Israel’s domestic political calculations. Netanyahu has increasingly become a liability for Israel’s external relations after confrontations and crises with Turkey and Iran, while Israel’s relations have grown more difficult even with Arab states with which it has peace treaties and other agreements. Its image has also deteriorated among broad sectors of Western public opinion. Britain offers a clear example of this recent shift, particularly through measures taken against settlers and settler violence in the West Bank.

 

Even in Washington, the relationship between Donald Trump and Netanyahu is no longer what it once was. The US-Israeli alliance remains strong, but differences have emerged over several regional issues. Some within the US administration may see a different Israeli government as offering a better opportunity to recalibrate Washington’s relations with Israel and its regional allies.

 

This helps explain the regional and international anticipation of a “post-Netanyahu” era. Yet a more important question remains: What if Netanyahu actually leaves? Will Israel change? Would we see a fundamental shift in its policies toward Palestinian statehood, the West Bank and Gaza, or toward Lebanon, Syria and the wider region?

 

In this context, Nathan Brown, a professor of political science and a leading expert on the region, offers an important answer in an article published by Carnegie’s Diwan on September 15 under the title “Old Wine in New Battles.” Brown warns against reducing Israel’s current transformation to Netanyahu himself. The security doctrine that has taken shape since October 7 appears to be broader than Netanyahu, while potential political alternatives, despite their differences, share essential elements of it.

 

Brown’s central argument concerns Israel’s transition from a doctrine of deterrence to one of prevention. Under the previous model, an adversary could possess dangerous military capabilities while Israel sought to deter it from using them. Under the emerging doctrine, however, possession of the capability itself becomes the problem. It is no longer enough to deter Hezbollah from firing its missiles; Israel seeks to prevent it from rebuilding its arsenal. Nor is containing Hamas considered sufficient; the objective becomes preventing it from reconstructing its military and governing capabilities.

 

The same logic extends to Syria and Turkey, and even potentially to states that maintain peaceful relations with Israel. The new doctrine shifts the concept of security from dealing with intentions to dealing with capabilities. Governments change, alliances shift and a weak state today may become powerful tomorrow. Political settlements can therefore no longer, as they once did, remove another state’s military capabilities from Israel’s security calculations.

 

More dangerously, this doctrine contains a self-reproducing logic. If an adversary rebuilds its capabilities, the conclusion is that the previous strike was insufficient. If Israeli military operations generate greater hostility, that hostility itself becomes further evidence for the need to continue them. The strategy therefore contains no natural endpoint. “Temporary” security zones and military positions in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria could gradually become permanent realities, while the boundary between defence and control becomes increasingly blurred.

 

The Palestinian question offers the clearest test. A less extreme government might come to power—one that rejects displacement, restrains settlers, restores a greater role for diplomacy and once again speaks of a “political horizon.” But if genuine Palestinian sovereignty remains unacceptable, while full political equality within a single state is also rejected, then the essence of the equation will not have changed very much.

 

Expectations surrounding the coming elections should therefore remain measured. Netanyahu’s departure, if it occurs, could matter considerably in terms of rhetoric, political instruments and Israel’s international relations. It would not necessarily, however, mark the end of the security doctrine that has become entrenched in recent years.

 

The real question is no longer simply: Who will govern Israel after the elections? It is: What concept of security will govern Israel after Netanyahu?