In recent weeks, the Iranian-aligned Houthi forces have intensified their attacks on Saudi Arabia, threatening the Kingdom’s ability to export oil to global markets and thereby potentially driving up global oil prices, as Iran would like to see. However, the apparent reluctance of the United States to assist Saudi Arabia in confronting the Houthis in the Red Sea leaves many questions unanswered. The broader picture suggests that the American ally in the region can no longer be relied upon to provide security and protection to the same extent as previously assumed.

 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratneyhas stated that “the Saudis are extremely frustrated and that this is the worst-case scenario they could have anticipated.” He also argues that one of the reasons behind Saudi Arabia’s massive investments in the United States is the security partnership that the Kingdom now needs. Dan Shapiro, writing in The New York Times, explains the apparent U.S. reluctance to assist Saudi Arabia by pointing to Washington’s engagement in an open war with Iran. According to this argument, U.S. naval forces are deployed across the region to respond to threats from Iran and its regional proxies, while American strategic ammunition stockpiles are under pressure. In other words, the United States may not be capable of fighting two wars simultaneously, even if it wanted to assist Saudi Arabia.

 

This does not, of course, mean that Saudi Arabia relies entirely on the United States for its security. Rather, Riyadh appears to have recognized since the war with Iran that the American security umbrella may no longer extend beyond Israel in the way it once did. The Kingdom has therefore sought strategic partnerships with other regional powers that could compensate for this unfavorable scenario. The Mecca Agreement can be viewed, in this context, as one attempt to compensate for the perceived decline of American security support.

 

It is clear that the Saudis do not want to fight the Houthis alone. Their previous experience—the military campaign against the Houthis, which lasted approximately a decade—is an experience they do not want to repeat. Instead, they are seeking partnerships with major regional powers to help prevent the Houthis from controlling the Bab el-Mandeb and to deter further attacks against Saudi territory.

 

But the central question is: Why have the Houthis moved so forcefully toward Bab el-Mandeb at this particular moment?

 

The answer appears to be connected to the calculations of several regional and international powers, most importantly Russia, China, Iran, and the Houthis themselves.

 

 

Iran and the Search for an Alternative Maritime Pressure Point

 

 

Iran has increasingly come to perceive that its control over the Strait of Hormuz may be moving toward a point where this important strategic card could lose some of its value in negotiations with the United States. The main reason Iran has sought to retain leverage over the Strait is its ability to influence global energy prices and, consequently, exert pressure on the United States and the Gulf states while increasing international pressure to end the war against Iran.

 

Iran’s strategy worked relatively well at the beginning of the war. Even up to the signing of the memorandum of understanding, Iran appeared to be the principal beneficiary of several of its provisions. However, its excessive reliance on this strategic card may prove to have been one of Iran’s major strategic mistakes.

 

Iranian intransigence has encouraged the United States, oil-producing countries in the region, and oil-consuming countries around the world to search for alternatives that would reduce the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.

 

Iran’s strategy of controlling or threatening the Strait has gradually lost some of its significance because of increased oil exports through the southern Omani route, as well as the use of larger oil tankers capable of transporting greater volumes of oil with fewer vessels. China has also reduced its oil consumption and increased its reliance on alternative energy sources. In addition, oil-producing countries outside the Gulf—such as Brazil—have helped compensate for part of the global shortfall in Gulf oil supplies.

 

Another factor is the unprecedented economic pressure and sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, which have increasingly become an alternative to direct military strikes. Iran may be capable of responding effectively to military attacks, but it is now facing significant difficulties in responding to the economic isolation imposed on it by the United States.

 

Together, these measures have helped the global economy become more resilient and recover without oil prices rising to levels that would seriously damage global economic growth, as Iran had hoped. This created an incentive for the Houthi front to become more active, move toward the Bab el-Mandeb, place particular pressure on Saudi Arabia—the world’s largest oil exporter—and disrupt global trade in an attempt to turn maritime insecurity into a bargaining tool.

 

 

Russia and the Houthis

 

 

Russia is among the major powers that has a direct interest in the Houthis’ advance toward Bab el-Mandeb.

 

First, Russia benefits from higher global oil prices. Any major global oil or energy crisis can directly benefit Moscow, particularly by increasing the value and export potential of Russian oil, which remains subject to extensive Western sanctions.

 

Second, threatening the closure of the Bab el-Mandeb allows the Houthis to create additional pressure on the United States and Europe. Moscow can also potentially use the Houthis as a strategic card in its broader confrontation with Ukraine and the European states.

 

A number of analyses have suggested that Russia may have provided the Houthis with location coordinates and advanced intelligence in their confrontation with Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. Russia also has an interest in increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia, influencing its relationship with Ukraine, and potentially encouraging greater Saudi purchases of Russian weapons.

 

Previous reports have suggested that Moscow has supported the Houthis as a means of challenging Washington and the West. According to an analysis by the Atlantic Council, the Houthis are no longer merely Iranian proxies but have increasingly become a tool through which the Kremlin can expand its influence in the region and confront the West.

 

The relationship between Russia and the Houthis appears to have moved beyond a temporary tactical relationship toward a more integrated military and intelligence partnership. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, has provided direct technical assistance in Houthi-controlled Sana’a under the cover of humanitarian assistance. This assistance reportedly includes advanced data-tracking systems that have enhanced the Houthis’ ability to target vessels in the Red Sea with greater precision.

 

Reports have also alleged the involvement of the well-known Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout in weapons-smuggling operations benefiting the Houthis, illustrating the reported depth of military cooperation. Saudi Arabia appears to have recognized this development earlier and raised the issue with Russia, but Moscow seems to have calculations that extend beyond its relationship with Riyadh.

 

Diplomatically, Russia has also supported the Houthis through its positions at the United Nations Security Council. In 2015, Moscow abstained from voting on Resolution 2216, which imposed an arms embargo on the Houthis, thereby allowing them to remain an effective political and military card.

 

 

China: The Hidden but Effective Player

 

 

China has emerged as a less visible but potentially influential actor in supporting Ansar Allah, the Houthi movement. Despite Beijing’s traditional rhetoric emphasizing peace and non-interference, intelligence reports have alleged that China has provided substantial support to the Houthis indirectly through Iran, their principal regional sponsor.

 

This support has reportedly included dual-use technologies, components for missiles and drones, and satellite imagery. Such assistance has not only strengthened Houthi military capabilities but may also have altered the balance of power with other Yemeni actors.

 

The Houthis’ recent advance toward the Bab el-Mandeb therefore raises questions about whether they have received assistance and intelligence from several states that have strategic interests in challenging the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Europe.

 

In response, Washington has imposed a series of sanctions on Chinese companies accused of supplying the Houthis with advanced military-related technologies, including satellite imagery and electronic components used in drones and missiles.

 

In April 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions against China’s Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., accusing the company of providing sensitive space-based services to the Houthis that could be used to target international shipping in the Red Sea.

 

China has also clearly benefited from this balancing dynamic. Chinese vessels have often appeared to be less exposed to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, while attacks have been directed primarily at Western-linked shipping. This apparent pattern has strengthened speculation about possible understandings—whether direct or mediated—between the Houthis and Beijing.

 

 

A Complex Network of Relationships

 

 

These complex and interconnected relationships between Ansar Allah, Russia, China, and Iran may help explain the Houthis’ continued military advantage over Yemen’s government forces. They may also help explain why Saudi Arabia was unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough during the years it fought the Houthis.

 

Saudi Arabia therefore has strong grounds to avoid returning to a situation in which it confronts the Houthis alone. It also has reason to seek international and regional partnerships capable of limiting Iran’s influence over strategically important maritime routes.

 

Although the immediate consequences of this problem are particularly significant for Saudi Arabia, its implications extend far beyond the Kingdom. Control over, or threats to, major maritime chokepoints affect global energy prices, international trade, and the balance of power across the region.

 

The central question, therefore, is not simply whether the Houthis have managed to move toward Bab el-Mandeb. The more important question is whether their advance represents an independent Houthi strategic achievement—or the outcome of a broader regional and international alignment in which the Houthis have been enabled to exploit a strategically critical maritime chokepoint.