Jordan is not a direct party to the American Israeli war on Iran, but it falls within the circle of clear economic impact, especially if the war continues for a longer period.

 

The effects of such wars do not remain confined to the battlefields; rather, they quickly extend to neighboring economies through energy, transport, trade, and tourism, and then their repercussions expand to broader levels in the global economy, as has already begun to appear.

 

The clearest channel of this impact is energy. Circulating estimates indicate that the rise in oil prices at the levels we are currently witnessing could cost Jordan tens of millions of dollars per month. This is not merely an increase in the import bill, but the beginning of broader pressures extending to the costs of electricity, transportation, and production. Even if the inflationary impact does not appear from the very first moment, the continuation of the war means that these costs will gradually be passed on to the prices of goods and services, putting pressure on local markets and weakening the purchasing power of households, especially given already low-income levels.

 

But the danger is not limited to rising oil prices alone; it is also linked to the possibility of the war being prolonged in a way that disrupts navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, with the possibility that the disturbance may also extend to the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In such a scenario, oil, insurance, and shipping prices could rise to very high and unpredictable levels. This places Jordan, as an economy that depends on imported energy and on regional and international supply chains, in a highly sensitive position. Every disruption in trade or every increase in transport costs is reflected directly in local industry, which depends on imported inputs, then on importers, and finally on the end consumer.

 

In this context, trade is no less important than energy. The rise in shipping charges in some cases to four and more times their normal level, and the noticeable increase in air freight prices, mean that the crisis threatens not only the flow of goods, but also raises the cost of producing and transporting them. This puts pressure on the competitiveness of Jordanian industry and increases the burden on the trade balance and the current account. When import costs rise, the outcome is also social: higher prices, lower purchasing power, and greater pressure on the middle and poorer classes.

 

As for tourism, it appears to be one of the most fragile sectors at this stage. The mere escalation of travel warnings to the region is enough to change the decisions of tourists and travel companies. This threatens one of the most important sources of income, foreign currency, and job opportunities.

 

The Jordanian economy, despite enjoying financial and monetary stability, remains vulnerable to gradual depletion if the war continues and its economic and temporal effects widen. The importance of what the government has done so far has become evident in preserving stability, monitoring markets, and benefiting from available reserve and support tools, which has helped contain the initial impact of the crisis and prevent its rapid transmission. But this margin, despite its importance, remains limited, and it cannot be relied upon alone if war turns into a long and open-ended crisis.

 

Hence, the coming stage requires building on what has been achieved by the government so far, not merely being satisfied with it. Alongside monitoring prices, diversifying energy sources, and using reserves cautiously, there is a need for an emergency plan for supply and shipping, and for more direct measures to protect the most vulnerable groups, provide liquidity to the most affected sectors such as tourism, transport, and industry, in addition to continuing economic and diplomatic efforts to secure external support when needed. The challenge is no longer only to absorb the shock, but to prevent it from turning into broader livelihood and social pressure.