Great powers do not suddenly lose their influence or impact on the international stage; rather, the process unfolds gradually, making it difficult to observe directly. Despite the United States possessing superior military and economic capabilities, geopolitical shifts in the region and recent developments suggest that such superiority is no longer sufficient to guarantee political influence or the compliance of regional states. This decline in American standing is reflected in the growing independence of its allies, Iran's adoption of clear defiant positions, and the expanding role of external powers such as China and Russia in shaping the course of the conflict.

 

 

In reality, the United States remains the pre-eminent military and economic power in the world and continues to achieve important tactical successes — whether in targeting the Iranian nuclear program or in its earlier unconventional war on terror against Al-Qaeda and ISIS. However, the concept of "declining standing" is not measured solely by military capability or battlefield successes, but by the ability to achieve long-term strategic objectives and maintain international influence. In this context, Paul Kennedy argues in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers that great powers do not collapse as a result of direct military defeats, but due to what he terms "imperial overstretch" — where external commitments exceed the state's economic capacities, gradually eroding its overall power. Similarly, John Mearsheimer, within the framework of offensive realist theory, argues that maintaining hegemony requires converting military superiority into sustainable political influence, and that failure to do so may lead to a decline in international standing despite continued military dominance.

Declining hegemonic powers tend to pursue high-risk military interventions for several reasons: domestic political pressures, overconfidence, and a desire to reinforce their credibility before international adversaries and dispel doubts about their capabilities. In the case of the Iran war, according to this framework, it was not a war of necessity that the United States needed to preserve its existence or neutralise a future threat to American interests. This has been evident in the domestic controversy in the United States — between those who view it as a necessary war to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that threaten American existence (a position represented by the current administration), and those who increasingly oppose it, including Democrats and many political analysts and media figures who believe the previous approach of containment and deterrence was preferable.

Francis Fukuyama emphasises that institutional erosion, weakening political trust, and rising societal polarisation are central factors in weakening states from within, which in turn negatively affects their ability to manage foreign policy effectively.

On this basis, it can be argued that the real challenge facing the United States lies not in its ability to achieve tactical military successes — as it does in the war with Iran and its unconventional conflicts — but in its ability to translate these successes into sustainable strategic achievements while preserving its internal cohesion. According to a poll conducted by Quinnipiac University on satisfaction with the war on Iran, 54% of citizens opposed the war while 39% supported it; and according to another poll by Reuters, only 29% believed the war was worth its cost. These figures indicate low public legitimacy for the war among the American people and diminished confidence in Trump and his administration. Should adversaries perceive a gap between military power and strategic effectiveness, they may be emboldened to adopt bolder policies in confronting the United States — not because of its absolute weakness, but due to the decline in its capacity for comprehensive deterrence and effective management of the international order.

The war on Iran has had a significant impact on the United States' international standing. According to the New York Times, published in March 2026, the most damaging blow to America's hegemony was Iran's seizure of control over the Strait of Hormuz and its grip on the lifeline of the global economy. This strait carries 20% of the world's oil supplies, making it a bargaining chip for Iran more powerful than its nuclear program — and one Iran did not possess before the war. Moreover, Iran's policy of closing the strait is relatively low-cost: a few threats involving naval mines, drones, or fast suicide boats are sufficient to close or restrict movement through the strait, causing global energy prices to surge — in stark contrast to the enormous cost of any attempt to reopen it. This constitutes a direct blow to American prestige, benefiting Russia and China in particular, and no previous president with a sound strategy would have created such an opportunity for America's adversaries.

 

The second significant blow to American deterrence capability was the serious difficulty in replenishing vital interceptor missile stockpiles during the war. Reports from the Center for Strategic and International Studies indicate that a miscalculation of the time required for the battle — and the expectation that it would end quickly — led to the excessive use of American missile stockpiles in the conflict. Tomahawk and Patriot missiles used to intercept Iranian missiles and drones were consumed at a high rate; experts say that a quarter of America's strategic stockpile was used in the war, and that restoring pre-war inventory levels will take years. As a result, the Pentagon withdrew missile stockpiles from South Korea that were designated for protecting American forces and allies in East and Southeast Asia, potentially leaving American forces in the Pacific exposed. While logistical in nature, this carries strategic implications for the sustainability of future confrontations with major military powers such as China and Russia.

The third blow to American prestige was the refusal of America's NATO allies, as well as Japan and Australia, to support President Trump in the war — particularly when he requested their assistance in reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Daniel Byman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington wrote that perhaps the most significant consequence of the war with Iran is the severe damage it has done to the relationship between the United States and its allies. Gulf states that suffered multiple attacks as a result of the war are deeply discontented and are reassessing their relationship with the United States, as their economies have taken heavy blows from a war they were not informed about in advance.

In addition, American soft power suffered a notable blow as a result of the hardline political rhetoric that accompanied the war, including threats to destroy Iran's civilizational infrastructure and statements that diminished the commitment to the laws of war and human rights. This rhetoric undermined the image the United States had spent decades cultivating as a defender of the rules-based international order.