The crisis at Aqaba Port is real. But it is not a failure of the port to receive ships or handle containers. Rather, it exposes a growing gap between the port’s operational efficiency and the wider logistics system’s ability to move goods onward at the same pace.

 

A container can be unloaded efficiently by crane, yet if it remains stranded in the yard, that operational success quickly becomes an economic bottleneck.

 

The current congestion is the result of several exceptional factors occurring at the same time: disruptions to shipping routes caused by geopolitical tensions, changes in vessel schedules and cancelled sailings, a sharp rise in transit traffic, and the accumulation of containers without a corresponding increase in the speed at which they are cleared and moved out of the system.

 

The operating figures do not contradict the existence of a crisis. They help explain its nature.

 

During the first half of 2026, the Aqaba Container Terminal handled 472,680 containers, compared with 468,062 during the same period last year. Jordan’s ports, meanwhile, recorded a 35 per cent increase in total cargo handling during the first five months of the year, reaching about 4.85 million tonnes.

 

But the more revealing figures are found in the composition of that traffic.

 

During the first seven months of the year, transit containers jumped from 30,763 to 80,235—an increase of 160.8 per cent. Containers bound for Iraq surged from 3,599 to 37,182, a staggering 933.1 per cent increase.

 

These numbers put the Aqaba crisis in perspective. Total container traffic grew only modestly during the first half of the year, but the routes and destinations of the cargo changed dramatically.

 

As a result, pressure shifted from the quayside to the yards, gates, customs-clearance operations and trucking network. The logistics system was suddenly dealing with flows for which not every part of the chain was equally prepared.

 

This is therefore not simply a port-operational problem. It is a systemic logistics crisis.

 

The Aqaba Container Terminal has a stated capacity of 1.3 million TEUs, which can reportedly be expanded to two million through additional manpower and longer operating hours. Aqaba also has logistics yards offering up to two million square metres of storage space.

 

But theoretical capacity means little when container dwell times rise and turnover slows.

 

The real measure of congestion is not how quickly a ship can be unloaded. It is how long it takes for a container to leave the logistics system altogether.

 

 

Every additional day adds costs for storage, terminal charges, detention and transportation. It ties up importers’ capital, delays exporters and, eventually, pushes those costs onto businesses, consumers and the wider economy.

 

The trucking network is an equally important part of the problem.

 

When trucks are delayed for days at certain border crossings, they are effectively removed from the transport cycle. They cannot return to Aqaba to collect new cargo, creating a shortage of available trucking capacity. In other words, a disruption that begins outside the port can eventually feed back into the port itself.

 

That is why managing the supply chain as a whole is more important than managing the port yards alone.

 

Aqaba has already taken several important steps. These include opening a yard for long-dwell containers, allocating a separate area for empty containers, facilitating the movement of refrigerated containers and extending the free-storage period for outbound containers from seven to 14 days.

 

Such measures can ease immediate pressure and mitigate the effects of congestion. But they largely deal with the consequences after congestion has occurred. They do not address the underlying causes.

 

What Jordan needs now is a 24/7 logistics operations room with real decision-making authority. It should bring together the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority, port management, the container terminal, customs authorities, regulators, shipping agents and customs brokers.

 

Its mandate should include accelerating customs clearance, strengthening risk-based inspection, extending working hours and connecting all relevant agencies electronically through a single platform.

 

Aqaba already has four main truck waiting areas and a customs centre for inspection and storage. A new yard with a capacity of 600 TEUs has also been established.

 

But the next phase requires something more fundamental: an early-warning system capable of identifying congestion before it happens and coordinating the allocation of ships, containers and trucks according to available capacity.

 

The Aqaba crisis should not be viewed solely as a problem to be contained. It is also an opportunity for Jordan to rethink and redesign its logistics model.

 

A successful port is not measured simply by the number of containers its cranes can unload. Its real performance is measured by how quickly and at what cost goods can reach their final destination.

 

Without integrated management of this entire journey, every surge in trade will remain vulnerable to turning into another congestion crisis—one whose costs will ultimately be borne by the national economy.