In the American-Israeli confrontation with Iran, the geopolitical clock appears to have stopped at the stage of a fragile truce: neither a stable peace nor a fully-fledged war. The opposing parties resemble a rider who has placed one foot in the stirrup but has not yet mounted the horse. The feet of all actors have sunk into the shifting sands of the Strait of Hormuz, where escalation has become a strategic catastrophe for both sides, while retreat without tangible gains could threaten the political future of the leaders driving the conflict.

 

 

 

From the Iranian perspective, this phase of strategic freezing serves Tehran tactically. The halt in direct attacks has provided Iranian forces with an opportunity to regroup its forces, recover from the losses, and reposition. However, in the long term, this situation will have critical impact on both: the Iranian regime and the Iranian people. The latter continue to endure mounting economic and social pressures. In this context, the American sanctions and maritime blockade are achieving their objectives through a logic of gradual attrition of Iranian resources.

 

The blockade impacted Iranian ports and oil refineries through an increasingly struggling with excess crude supplies. Experts argue that the process of extracting the oil cannot simply be halted when needed. Technically, oil extraction does not operate according to the same principles as water extraction. While a water well can be shut down relatively easily by stopping the pump and closing the valve, Oil production, however, involves complex geological and technical dynamics that only specialists fully understand. Crude oil extraction must be pumped continuously, day and night, and there is no straightforward mechanism to completely halt production until export conditions improve. This reality explains the existence of “force majeure” clauses in international oil contracts, which allow exporters to suspend deliveries without incurring legal penalties during wars or major crises.

 

Stopping oil production for prolonged periods can lead to significant structural changes within the reservoir. Pressure imbalances may allow water and gas to displace recoverable oil, potentially causing long-term and sometimes irreversible damage to oil fields. Consequently, the United States is betting that Iran will eventually be unable to absorb or store the massive quantities of unsold crude, thereby forcing Tehran to yield to American demands.

 

Although Iran possesses limited overland export alternatives toward countries such as China and Pakistan, the volume of production far exceeds the carrying capacity of land transportation networks. This creates a critical chokepoint that Washington seeks to exploit through maritime containment and pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, hoping to weaken Iran’s resistance.

 

The effects of sanctions, however, extend far beyond the energy sector. Declining imports, rising inflation, and the erosion of purchasing power among the middle class are placing enormous pressure on Iranian society. These conditions may eventually fuel public frustration, protests, and broader social unrest. From the perspective of coercive diplomacy, the United States aims to gradually erode Iran’s technological, military, and financial capabilities while pushing Tehran toward an agreement that falls short of its nuclear and regional ambitions.

 

Yet the assumption that Iran can be quickly broken remains questionable. The Islamic Republic has survived under varying forms of sanctions and isolation for more than five decades, developing resilient mechanisms of adaptation and what may be described as an “economy of resistance.” Indeed, there are growing indications that Tehran has succeeded in transforming negotiations into a tool for managing time and exhausting American political will. At times, Washington appears to be in a constant state of waiting for the Iranian response.

 

From the American side, prolonging the conflict carries increasing strategic costs. Escalation has placed pressure on global energy markets and intensified concerns among Arab allies, who are directly affected by regional instability without possessing meaningful control over its trajectory. At the same time, the American public has become increasingly skeptical of prolonged military engagements following the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. Any drift toward another open-ended confrontation could therefore become a significant political burden on the U.S. administration.

 

Iran appears fully aware of this reality. As a result, it has adopted a strategy of prolonging negotiations, believing that time may ultimately work in its favor. Tehran does not necessarily view endurance as a complete victory, but rather as a means of surviving the current phase while reshaping the broader international political environment. Iran is also wagering on potential changes in the American political landscape following upcoming elections, hoping that shifts within Congress could reduce the intensity of pressure against it.

 

The central question today is not simply whether the war will end, but rather what form the next phase of the conflict will take. Are we witnessing a temporary truce, or the emergence of a new model of “no war, no peace” similar to other protracted conflicts in the Middle East? Comparisons with the Gaza war are particularly revealing, as many early predictions anticipated a rapid resolution before the conflict evolved into a prolonged war of attrition.

 

Although the American president does not appear inclined toward prolonged gray-zone confrontations, unlike Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who often favors maintaining a permanent state of regional tension and sustained military intervention capability, dismantling the massive American military buildup in the region will not be an easy decision. Israel views the current moment as a rare strategic opportunity to fundamentally weaken Iran, fearing that any premature American withdrawal could allow Tehran to reemerge stronger and more dangerous in the future.

 

For this reason, expectations of a rapid American military withdrawal before securing an agreement that preserves U.S. credibility and strategic deterrence appear unrealistic. The more likely scenario is that the region is entering a prolonged phase of what may be described as “hot stagnation,” characterized by continuing economic pressure, intermittent negotiations, limited security operations, and shadow warfare, without either a comprehensive peace settlement or a decisive final confrontation.