President Donald Trump's second term has been marked by an evident reshuffling of longstanding US national security priorities. The publication of the 2026 US Counterterrorism Strategy coincides with the approaching twenty-fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks and offers perhaps the clearest indication yet that the post-9/11 security framework has been revised.

 

For much of the past quarter century, US national security policy was anchored in the belief that instability in the Middle East and the threat posed by transnational terrorist organisations constituted core American security concerns. Yet as Washington's strategic focus shifts elsewhere, Iraq and Syria appear increasingly absent from a strategy that once would have placed them at its center.

 

This shift is reflected in a series of policy decisions, most notably the National Security Strategy and, more recently, the US Counterterrorism Strategy. Together, these documents point to a departure from the post-9/11 framework, embracing a strategy that increasingly transfers responsibility for regional security challenges onto US allies and partners. Washington allies and partners.

 

Rather than remaining directly engaged in counterterrorism operations across multiple theatres, Washington is reducing its involvement while placing greater responsibility for regional security challenges on local actors. Indeed, elements of this approach were visible prior to the strategy's publication, from Washington's growing emphasis on transferring security responsibilities to regional partners to its evolving designation of threats it considers most relevant to US national security.

 

Yet states that have long relied on American military, intelligence, and logistical support in counterterrorism efforts will now face far more significant challenges as Washington steps back.

 

Nowhere are the implications of this shift more explicit than in Iraq and Syria. While both countries have made significant progress since the territorial defeat of the Daesh terror group in 2019, neither has fully overcome the political, institutional, and security vulnerabilities that facilitated the group's emergence in the first place.

 

Years of conflict, state fragmentation, and governance failure have left both states heavily reliant on external support, raising questions about whether they are prepared to shoulder greater counterterrorism responsibilities as Washington seeks to reduce its own role.

 

Syria's ongoing transition illustrates perhaps the clearest limitation of Washington's burdenshifting approach. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, President Ahmad Al Sharaa has sought to position his government as a credible counterterrorism partner by joining the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh in late 2025 and advancing efforts to incorporate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. Yet these developments expose a contradiction at the heart of the new US strategy. For more than a decade, the SDF served as Washington's primary partner against Daesh, overseeing detention facilities, intelligence networks, and counterterrorism operations across northeastern Syria. Today, those same structures are being absorbed into a state that is itself undergoing a fragile political transition. Responsibility is therefore being transferred before the foundations of long-term stability have been fully established.

 

Recent security trends paint a more complex picture. Although Syria improved from third to sixth place in the 2026 Global Terrorism Index, it still recorded the highest number of Daesh attacks globally, with 238 incidents. ISIS remained responsible for nearly 80 per cent of terrorism-related deaths and 98 per cent of recorded terrorist incidents in the country during 2025, underscoring the group's continued operational presence despite the collapse of its territorial self-styled caliphate.

 

Earlier this year, the transfer of Daesh detainees from Syria to Iraq exposed the practical realities of burdenshifting in action.

 

While intended to mitigate risks associated with Syria's fragile transition, the move effectively relocated responsibility for one of the region's most complex counterterrorism challenges onto Baghdad. The question was no longer whether these detainees posed a security concern, but which state would bear the long-term political, legal, and security burden of managing them. Ultimately, Syria remains in the difficult process of rebuilding state institutions, integrating aremed actors, and consolidating authority. These challenges underscore that the country’s transition remains incomplete and that the institutional foundations required for long-term counterterrorism effectiveness are still being built.

 

Iraq presents a different, yet equally important, challenge. Unlike Syria, Iraq is not grappling with state reconstruction, but rather with the limitations of state consolidation. While Baghdad has achieved significant security gains since the territorial defeat of Daesh, its political and security landscape remains shaped by competing centres of power. The formation of a new government under Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi comes amid economic pressures, regional uncertainty, and renewed tensions between Washington and Tehran. Although Al Zaidi has pledged to strengthen state authority, Iran-backed militias remain deeply embedded within Iraq's political and security landscape, complicating efforts to consolidate state control.

 

This is where the limitations of Washington's burdenshifting approach become clear. Effective counterterrorism extends beyond kinetic operations. It also relies on the institutional capacity to coordinate intelligence, detention, and rehabilitation efforts in a coherent and sustainable manner. Yet Iraq continues to navigate political fragmentation, governance challenges, and competing security actors, even as it assumes additional responsibilities such as the transfer of Daesh detainees from Syria. While Baghdad is undoubtedly more capable than it was during the height of Daesh’s expansion, expecting Iraq to absorb greater counterterrorism burdens risks overlooking the structural constraints that continue to shape its security environment.

 

The risk is not necessarily an immediate resurgence of ISIS similar to 2014, nor does it suggest that either Iraq or Syria is on the verge of collapse. Rather, it is that reduced violence may be mistaken for durable stabilization. The conditions that extremist organisations have historically exploited-fragmented authority, competing security actors, governance gaps, and unresolved political grievances-have not entirely disappeared. By transferring greater responsibility to local actors before these vulnerabilities are fully addressed, Washington is effectively betting that institutional consolidation will outpace the ability of extremist networks to adapt and reconstitute themselves.

 

The question is not whether Iraq and Syria should assume greater responsibility for their own security; they ultimately must. The question is whether Washington is transferring responsibility faster than those states can absorb it. The 2026 Counterterrorism Strategy reflects a broader “America First” effort to prioritise challenges closer to home. Yet strategic priorities can change faster than realities on the ground. Afghanistan demonstrated the risks of such gaps. In Iraq and Syria, where many of the drivers of extremism remain unresolved, the lesson should not be forgotten.

 

Farrah Al Abdallat is a Research Analyst at Nama Strategic Intelligence Solutions, Amman, Jordan.