Jordanian-Syrian relations have never been merely ordinary relations between two neighbouring countries. Geography, history and socio-economic ties have made the security of both countries deeply intertwined. When the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011, its effects were not confined within Syria's borders. Rather, its repercussions spilled over into Jordan in the form of waves of refugees, a decline in cross-border trade, an increase in smuggling operations, security threats and pressure on water resources, infrastructure and public services. Thus, Jordan's northern border transformed from a bridge for exchange and communication into a forward line for managing risks.

 

However, the transformations that Syria has witnessed since the end of 2014 allow for a reformulation of the relationship on different foundations. What is needed today is not a return to the pre-war status quo, but rather the construction of a new model based on the understanding that a stable Syria represents a strategic depth for Jordan's security and economy, and that a stable Jordan, open to its surroundings, constitutes a vital gateway for Syria to regain its Arab and regional presence. Hence, the need to shift from a policy of managing the repercussions of the crisis to a strategy of forging shared interests in the post-crisis phase.

 

The post-crisis phase does not mean that Syria has overcome all challenges; it is undergoing a delicate transitional phase that requires the continued development of state institutions, the strengthening of the rule of law, the support of national reconciliation efforts, and the consolidation of security and stability throughout its territory and borders. Nevertheless, Syria possesses the essential elements of statehood and the national and institutional capabilities that enable it to gradually regain its full effectiveness, thereby strengthening its unity, sovereignty, and its Arab and regional role. The fundamental challenge lies in protecting the transitional phase from foreign interference, separatist projects, and Israeli aggression, and preventing southern Syria from becoming an arena for regional competition or a buffer zone imposed by forces outside the state.

 

For Jordan, the strategic shift begins with redefining border security. Strengthening military surveillance or thwarting smuggling operations is no longer sufficient, as sustainable security is not achieved solely along the border, but also within the surrounding economic and social environment. The stability of Daraa and Suwaida, the return of Syrian state institutions, job creation and the resumption of formal trade are all elements that serve Jordanian national security more effectively than simply addressing the security consequences. Therefore, the two countries need a joint system for early warning, information sharing, and combating drug, arms and terrorism smuggling, in parallel with development projects linking southern Syria to the governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, and Ramtha.

 

Economically, geography presents an opportunity to transform the two countries into a link between the Gulf, the Levant, Turkey and Europe. The Jaber-Nassib crossing is not merely a border point, but a key hub in a strategic corridor that can revitalise land transport, trade, and logistics. Jordan can play a significant role in Syrian reconstruction through its expertise in the pharmaceutical, energy, education, health, digital services, banking and transportation sectors, while the Syrian market offers opportunities for Jordanian exports and investments. Syria, in turn, can benefit from the Port of Aqaba to access the Red Sea and African and Asian markets. The transition from ad hoc coordination to institutional cooperation has begun to emerge.

 

The Higher Coordination Council has become a regular framework for cooperation, and its second session in April 2026 witnessed the signing of nine agreements and memoranda of understanding covering multiple sectors. In June 2026, the two sides also discussed measures to facilitate truck movement, trade exchanges, land, air and rail transport, customs cooperation and joint strategic projects. These steps are important, but they require clear timelines and implementation indicators to prevent agreements from becoming bogged down in bureaucracy or regional fluctuations.

 

The water file represents a crucial test of the partnership's seriousness. The Yarmouk Basin is not a purely technical matter separate from politics and security; rather, it is an existential issue in light of water scarcity, climate change and declining rainfall. The launch of the joint Jordanian-Syrian water operational platform represents a significant step forward towards data exchange, technical coordination and the sustainable management of shared resources. This mechanism needs to be developed into a permanent one that includes monitoring wells and dams, addressing attacks on water resources, managing drought years, and ensuring equitable sharing, moving beyond a zero-sum approach.

 

As for the return of refugees, it should not be treated as an administrative process to close a file, but rather as a humanitarian and developmental path linked to security, housing, job opportunities, and services. More than 196,000 registered Syrian refugees returned from Jordan between December 2014 and the end of May 2016, but the sustainability of this return requires a safe environment, legal guarantees and projects to rehabilitate schools, hospitals, housing and income sources. Therefore, Jordan, in cooperation with Syria and international organisations, can lead an approach that gradually shifts funding from refugee assistance to recovery and reintegration within Syria.

 

Building a post-crisis partnership ultimately requires three pillars: Cooperative security that protects borders without turning them into permanent barriers; economic integration that restores both countries' positions on regional trade routes; and political coordination that protects Syria's unity and sovereignty and rejects aggression and partition projects. If the two countries succeed in transforming geography from a source of threat into a foundation for interdependence, the Jordanian-Syrian relationship could become an Arab model for moving from crisis containment to stability creation. The future of both countries is determined less by the border separating them than by their ability to build a shared space for security, development, and sovereignty.

 

Hasan Dajah is a professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University