A new line of thinking has recently gained traction within Jordanian political circles. On the surface, it calls for a comprehensive review of the political modernisation process, launched nearly five years ago, through the adoption of new electoral and political party laws, along with a broader package of political reforms. Its advocates argue that such a review is necessary to avoid taking major leaps into the unknown and to address potential contradictions between legislation and public policy on the one hand, and prevailing political culture and social realities on the other.

 

Some proponents of this approach go even further, suggesting a temporary freeze of the political modernization process over the coming years. They argue that Jordan should wait until the regional picture becomes clearer and the outcome of ongoing wars and conflicts—whose repercussions threaten stability across the region—is better understood. Implicit within this position is the idea of revisiting the electoral law itself, particularly the provision that gradually increases the share of parliamentary seats allocated to political parties to 50 percent in the next parliament and 65 per cent in the one that follows.

 

Such a move would send a political message, both domestically and internationally, that Jordan is retreating from—or at least hesitating about—the modernization project into which significant political capital has been invested. More importantly, it would cast doubt on the state's commitment to the long-term objective of developing parliamentary party governments, a goal repeatedly emphasized as a cornerstone of Jordan’s political future.

 

In principle, periodic reviews are both useful and necessary in any political process. There is no universal model for democratic transition that can simply be copied and applied. Countries follow different paths, shaped by their own histories, institutions, and social realities. Following parliamentary elections, two rounds of university elections, and significant domestic and regional developments, it is only natural to ask difficult but necessary questions: What has happened so far? What has worked? What has not? What adjustments are required?

 

The problem, however, is that for some—not all—those calling for “reviews,” the term has become a convenient substitute for something else: retreat. Many of these voices were never enthusiastic supporters of the modernization project in the first place. They could not openly oppose it because it had become a central component of the country’s political reform agenda. Consequently, their discourse shifted from direct opposition to questioning the feasibility of the project and, more recently, advocating its suspension or reversal. Different labels, perhaps, but they ultimately point in the same direction: resistance to moving forward with political modernisation.

 

If the argument for freezing reform is based on regional instability and the conflicts surrounding Jordan, it is a weak one. In fact, current regional developments make a stronger case for accelerating—not slowing—the modernization process.

 

There are two main reasons for this. First, political modernization strengthens the domestic front by fostering greater cohesion between state and society. It creates opportunities for political leadership that is connected to public concerns and capable of narrowing the widening gap that has emerged in recent years between governments and citizens.

 

Second, political modernization has become one of Jordan’s distinguishing features in a turbulent region. It reinforces a model of genuine political stability based on inclusion, moderation, participation, and mutual understanding between citizens and the state. This stands in contrast to approaches that rely on exclusion, repression, excessive securitization, and the cultivation of fear as a means of maintaining order.

 

Ironically, developments in Israel today offer a useful illustration of this point. Despite fighting multiple regional wars, facing significant security, economic, and political costs, and experiencing deep internal divisions, the Israeli Knesset has moved toward dissolving itself and holding early elections. No serious proposal has emerged to postpone elections because of regional instability, nor has the security environment been used as a justification for suspending democratic and political processes.

 

Others argue that Jordan’s political parties remain weak and have failed to build meaningful connections with society. This conclusion, however, deserves closer scrutiny. First, it is simply too early—and arguably unfair—to declare failure in what remains a relatively young political experiment that requires time to mature. Second, such judgments often rely more on impressions than on rigorous evaluation.

 

Recent analytical research conducted by the Politics and Society Institute examined the evolution of political parties following the modernization reforms through a broad set of measurable indicators. The findings present a far more nuanced picture, highlighting areas of success and failure, strengths and weaknesses, both among parliamentary parties and within the broader political experience itself.

 

The real challenge, therefore, is not whether the experiment should be aborted. Rather, it is how to strengthen its positive dimensions, address its shortcomings, and provide political parties with the independence, professionalism, and credibility necessary for long-term success.

 

Jordan certainly needs reviews. Every political project does. But there is an important distinction between reviewing a process in order to improve it and using the language of review as a vehicle for retreat. The first is a sign of confidence; the second is often an expression of doubt. At this stage, Jordan’s political modernization project requires careful evaluation and constructive correction—not hesitation about the destination itself.