Amid the rise of political and intellectual currents in the United States that sharply criticize the growing influence of pro-Israel lobbies on American administrations—particularly the administration of Donald Trump—a counter-campaign has emerged among Israeli politicians and analysts. This counter-argument maintains that the decision to go to war—widely attributed to and blamed on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—was not merely the product of Israeli pressure. Rather, it stemmed from distinct American motives, interests, and convictions held by President Trump himself.

 

Debates about the influence of the “Israel lobby” on U.S. foreign policy are not new. John Mearsheimer, among others, wrote a landmark book on the subject that resonated widely in Washington. Yet that work can now be seen as a historical baseline rather than a full account of subsequent developments—especially the growing role of Christian Zionist evangelical groups within Republican circles and the Trump administration. Their significant impact on U.S. policy toward Israel has transformed the discussion from a purely U.S.–Israel issue into a domestic American debate, extending deep into Republican politics and even the broader “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement.

 

On the other side, the debate in Tel Aviv takes on different dimensions. One strand reflects the position of political currents opposed to Netanyahu and critical of his close alignment with the Trump administration. From this perspective, Israel risks becoming subordinate to U.S. decision-making, with ultimate authority over war and peace residing in Washington. This view was articulated clearly by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in a recent article in Haaretz. Many Israeli politicians today argue that, despite the strong support Netanyahu has enjoyed from Trump, Israel has—for the first time—found its strategic decisions on war and peace heavily conditioned by the U.S. administration, whether in Gaza, southern Lebanon, or the decision to confront Iran.

 

It is true that this may be the first time the two countries have engaged in a war in such a closely coordinated manner. Yet this alignment has not come without political and sovereignty costs. Trump’s decision to end the war, for example, was not jointly negotiated with Netanyahu but taken unilaterally by Washington. While the U.S.–Israel relationship remains deeply rooted and historically resilient, this does not negate the fact that Israeli leaders have traditionally preserved a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making. One can revisit Master of the Game by Martin Indyk, which examines the 1973 war and Henry Kissinger’s role in reshaping the bilateral relationship—highlighting the frictions and challenges that arose not only on the Egyptian side but within Israel itself.

 

Meanwhile, Israeli commentators have pushed back against American narratives linking Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran to pressure from Netanyahu—or even to the claim that Trump was manipulated by him. This narrative gained traction following a report by The New York Times detailing internal deliberations within the U.S. administration, including a meeting in which Netanyahu reportedly argued in favor of war—a position Trump ultimately endorsed despite reservations from Vice President J.D. Vance and some senior security and military officials regarding the assumptions behind the strategy, including the notion of triggering regime collapse from within.

 

Within this context, two notable articles have been published. The first, by Dr. Eitan Shamir at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, asks: “Why Did Trump Go to War?” The second, by Danny Zaken, poses the question: “Who Really Dragged Whom into War?” Both challenge the prevailing narrative that Netanyahu dragged Trump into an unnecessary, optional war that primarily served Israeli—perhaps even personal—interests, and that has since become a liability for the U.S. administration.

 

Instead, these authors advance alternative explanations. Some focus on Trump’s own personality, suggesting a long-standing antagonism toward Iran, reflected in his previous statements and positions. Others point to his sense of personal affront in dealings with Tehran. Shamir, in particular, emphasizes a neorealist framework that situates the war within the broader strategic competition between the United States and China. Zaken, meanwhile, stresses that decision-making in the United States is institutional, complex, and far removed from the simplistic narrative of manipulation.

 

In conclusion, these American and Israeli debates reveal more than a disagreement over causality. They signal, first, the emergence of a new phase in the structuring of U.S.–Israel relations within both domestic arenas; and second, a growing sense of unease over the current outcomes of the war and the failure to achieve the decisive victory that both Trump and Netanyahu had promised.