What the recent Al Jazeera documents revealed about the involvement of Rami Makhlouf—Bashar al-Assad’s cousin—in financing insurgent movements along the Syrian coast cannot be reduced to an internal settling of scores within the ruling family. Rather, it reflects far deeper fractures within the regime’s structure and its relationship with its most sensitive social base. This is not about livelihood protests or localized discontent. We are talking about vast sums of money, heavyweight military figures—some of whom once held pivotal positions within the security establishment—and networks operating from beyond Syria’s borders, particularly from Russia and Lebanon.

 

The most dangerous aspect of this trajectory is that it feeds on genuine anxieties within the Alawite community, especially along the coast. Feelings of exhaustion, demographic loss, political marginalization, and economic exposure have accumulated over years. These anxieties are not fabricated; yet they become a political instrument once they are mobilized within an alternative—or parallel—political project that subtly suggests the “center” is no longer capable of providing protection, and that searching for other arrangements has become an existential necessity. It is precisely here that the game of dismantling the state from within begins—not through its traditional opposition, but through the erosion of its own social base.

 

This internal dimension is almost organically intertwined with more complex regional dynamics. Iran, whose ability to control the Syrian scene has noticeably declined, does not appear ready to withdraw quietly. Hence, the option of “limited chaos” offers a dual tool: obstructing stability on the one hand, and retaining a bargaining chip on the other—either to regain part of its influence or to keep Syria in a state of political and security fluidity that allows for future negotiation.

 

In the same context, Hezbollah’s position after the recent war cannot be overlooked. The blow it sustained was not merely military but strategic. Losing Syrian depth translates into a disturbance in the deterrence equation and a reduced capacity for regional maneuvering. Destabilizing the Syrian arena—even within carefully calibrated limits—recreates a margin of maneuver for Hezbollah in Lebanon and reshuffles the cards at an exceptionally sensitive domestic moment.

 

The paradox is that this trajectory converges—at least temporarily—with the Israeli vision. Israel has never wanted a strong Syrian state and has never concealed this position. Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements about establishing a buffer zone are not mere mobilizing rhetoric but expressions of a broader strategic vision based on fragmenting the Syrian space into zones of influence and isolating the regime from the south, including Suwayda, and potentially linking this path to northeastern Syria, where the Kurds are located.

 

Talk of a “David Corridor” is not political fantasy but part of a process of soft map-redrawing, where geography is governed by security rather than borders. More alarming still is that the idea of regions or partial entities—including scenarios of an Alawite coastal entity—is no longer taboo in some circles. It may not constitute a ready-made plan, but it has become a discussable possibility, which in itself signals a dangerous erosion of the idea of the centralized state.

 

The American position remains the most perplexing. What is publicly declared as support for paths led by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and as differentiation from Netanyahu’s agenda, collides with the reality of silence. The Trump administration does not practically oppose Israeli policies in Syria, and political acquiescence is not far removed from consent. What matters is not what is said, but what is allowed to happen—and what is unfolding on the ground today points to a deep convergence of interests, even if it is rhetorically denied.

 

Here, the Arab–Turkish question emerges as the question of the moment. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar, alongside Turkey—and with them Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia, in what has come to be called the “Arab-Islamic Group”—possess the capacity to influence events, yet have not moved to the level of strategic action required. The issue is no longer about supporting or opposing the regime, but about the urgent need to intervene to open a genuine Syrian internal track—one based on real mediation between the authorities and Syria’s diverse social components, and aimed at redefining national identity as an inclusive framework rather than an instrument of exclusion.

 

Without such intervention, Syria will remain an open arena for regional and international score-settling. Its fragmentation will not be a purely Syrian affair, but an earthquake shaking the entire regional security order. We are facing a moment in which the interests of historic adversaries—Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States—intersect, each for its own reasons, yet with a single outcome.