On March 10, I wrote an article in The Jordan Times entitled: “This War Is Not Ours: Why Is the Region Paying the Price for American and Israeli Ambitions?” In it, I warned against turning Arab lands into arenas for settling scores between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other, and against the peoples of the region bearing the cost of a war they did not participate in igniting and over which they have no control. Today, months after those warning, developments on the ground confirm that the danger has not diminished; rather, it has become more apparent and imminent.

 

The American-Iranian confrontation is entering a highly dangerous phase, not only because of the expanding scope of military operations, but also because the center of gravity of the war is gradually shifting toward Arab lands. Every time American forces and interests are attacked by Iran, political and military pressure mounts on Arab states with defense ties to Washington, turning their territories, airspace, bases, and national ports into part of the theater of operations, even if their governments haven't officially decided to participate in the war.

 

The problem is not the right of Arab states to defend their territories, airspace, and populations; this is an indisputable and legitimate sovereign right. The danger lies in gradually pushing them from a position of self-defense to one of direct involvement in a confrontation they did not initiate, and over which they have no control regarding its objectives, pace, or end date.

 

Recent developments have shown that Iran uses attacks on regional states as a means of pressuring Washington, while avoiding a direct confrontation with American naval vessels or reopening a broad military front with Israel. This equation places an increasing burden on Arab states to bear the cost of the war, transforming their security, economies, and infrastructure into tools of reciprocal pressure between Tehran and Washington.

 

However, American policy could lead to an even more dangerous outcome: transforming the confrontation from an American-Iranian war into an Arab-Iranian war. Western countries, regardless of their political stance, would then become involved. As the escalation continues, events could begin with the interception of a missile in defense of national airspace, then progress to targeting a launch site, before escalating into a series of strikes and counterstrikes leading to a full-blown conflict that would be difficult to contain.

 

This possibility is no longer a theoretical assumption; Arab countries have already been subjected to attacks targeting bases, facilities, and infrastructure, and several Arab regions have become forward operating bases as a result of the American military presence. This equation grants Washington significant operational and strategic depth, but leaves Arab societies vulnerable to missiles, drones, and security and economic instability.

 

Conversely, Israel today appears to be further removed from direct confrontation than in the initial stages, despite its officials' daily pronouncements about readiness and a desire to engage alongside the United States. With no practical implementation of these statements, they seem more like deterrent messages intended for media consumption, while the Arab states bear the actual consequences of the war. Herein lies the most serious question: Has President Donald Trump succeeded in gradually extricating Israel from direct confrontation, then begun to shift the burden onto Arab states, paving the way for reduced American involvement and standing by Israel to observe the region being torn apart, drained, and bearing the full cost of the war?

 

There may not be a declared American plan in this regard, but the facts on the ground necessitate caution. Washington seeks to protect its forces, minimize its losses, and expand its deterrent against Iran, and may find in involving its Arab allies a way to achieve these objectives without bearing the cost alone. At the same time, Israel can observe the attrition of its adversaries and its regional environment from a less exposed position, while the Arab states shoulder the human, economic, and strategic losses.

 

The cost of Arab involvement will be enormous; a large-scale war means threats to energy and water facilities, ports, and airports; increased insurance and maritime transport costs; a decline in investment and tourism; disruption of supply chains; and increased pressure on public budgets and citizens' living standards. Furthermore, expanding the confrontation to the vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb will expose Arab and global trade to an unprecedented crisis.

 

Therefore, the Arab position must be clear and unified: protecting sovereignty, land, and people is an indisputable duty, but participating in offensive operations or allowing the region to become a platform for open warfare is something entirely different. A distinction must be made between legitimate defensive cooperation and involvement in escalating the confrontation, while emphasising to both Washington and Tehran that Arab states are not battlegrounds, bargaining chips, or mailboxes for exchanging military messages.

 

What we said in March, we reiterate today with even greater conviction: this war is not our war, and it should not become so under any political or security pressure. The Arab interest does not lie in siding with one party over another, or in joining alliances that drain the region's resources, but rather in preventing the conflict from spilling over into its territories, and in protecting its sovereignty, its people, its vital infrastructure, and the future of its generations. Defending one's homeland is a duty, but it is fundamentally different from engaging in a war that serves the interests of external powers.

 

Major Powers may withdraw once they achieve their objectives, or when the cost of confrontation rises and their calculations change, leaving behind exhausted states, damaged economies, and societies facing instability. As for the Arab states, they alone will endure the most of the devastation, division, and attrition. Therefore, wisdom dictates adhering to positive neutrality, activating diplomacy, and rejecting the use of Arab land as an arena for conflict or a platform for exchanging military blows and messages.

 

Hasan Dajah is professor of strategic studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University