In a painting unveiled last week in St Petersburg, Russian artist Alexei Sergienko seated Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping side by side, with daisies at their feet and a banner behind them reading “Yalta 45.” Tomorrow, the three leaders meet in Shenzhen, China, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. What the artist may have overlooked is that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin arrived at Yalta on the verge of victory in a war they had fought together. Trump and Putin arrive in Shenzhen each burdened by a war he has been unable to end on his own terms.
The two wars reveal how much has changed since Washington emerged from the Cold War as the world’s sole superpower. The United States chooses when to strike Iran, then needs intermediaries to convey Tehran’s response. Russia invades its neighbour and spends almost five years trying to secure what it expected to gain within weeks. Consider, for a moment, the Security Council through the eyes of a Ukrainian who sees Russia wielding a veto, or an Iranian who sees the United States enjoying the same privilege. To whom can either turn?
The irony is that the two wars have already converged in a diesel deal. In the phone call in which Putin proposed the three-way summit to Trump, according to an October report in Israel Hayom citing The Wall Street Journal, the two men agreed to allow Russian diesel onto the market. Washington temporarily eased sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine to counter rising fuel prices fuelled in part by the war on Iran. That precedent may have tempted Trump to contemplate a broader bargain: accommodate some of Moscow’s demands in Ukraine in exchange for Russian and Chinese pressure on Tehran to accept his terms.
Putin gets some of what he wants the moment the cameras click. Sitting alongside the American and Chinese presidents fulfils a longstanding Russian ambition to have the Kremlin treated as Washington’s equal. He may offer to mediate with Iran in return for relief from particular sanctions. Yet he is unlikely to sacrifice a partnership he has needed in his own war in exchange for an American promise. And Trump, who announced before leaving for Asia that he would raise Ukraine, can sign a licence authorising Russian fuel sales. The signature that would surrender Ukrainian territory, however, remains in Kyiv.
Xi enters the summit wanting Asian countries to see him as a partner who safeguards trade. China has an interest in the Iranian crude purchased by some of its refineries, and in ensuring that Gulf tankers can pass safely through the Strait of Hormuz. Beijing therefore has reasons to mediate. But what if Trump wants it to help isolate Tehran? Would an offer to lower tariffs suffice when, on the very day he left Washington, his administration was tightening restrictions on Chinese companies’ access to AI chips through data centres in third countries?
The differences extend even to the issue Trump hopes will secure his presidency a place in history. Following the expiry of the New START treaty between Washington and Moscow last February, he wants to bring China into a new nuclear arms control framework. Beijing has an argument that is difficult to dismiss: each of the other two countries possesses an arsenal several times larger than its own. It wants to know how far they are prepared to reduce their stockpiles before committing to a ceiling on its arsenal.
Fifteen years ago, Barry Buzan argued in his study A World Order Without Superpowers that the world could retain several great powers while becoming increasingly difficult for any one of them to dominate, as the economic and technological gap underpinning the West’s historical ascendancy narrowed. Perhaps the clearest illustration of that argument is the weight of those absent from Shenzhen. What value would security guarantees or promises to rebuild Ukraine carry if the Germans, French and British were never asked what burdens they were prepared to shoulder?
This is where Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s call at Davos for cooperation among middle powers acquires its significance. Robin Niblett develops the idea in his new book, After America: The End of the Old Order and the Rise of the Middle Powers. Japan’s leadership in rescuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership after Trump withdrew during his first term offers an early example. Such countries can write some of the rules of trade together, while each retains its own calculations when it comes to relations with China or dependence on America’s security umbrella.
I expect tomorrow’s summit to leave room for a limited understanding. The three leaders might set a date for their experts to begin talks on nuclear risks. Washington might ease a specific sanction in exchange for Chinese and Russian efforts to support mediation with Tehran. But turning the summit into a substitute for the Security Council would mean that the first thing its veto-wielding participants bring to the table is the very disagreement that paralysed the council in New York. Even if all three agree tomorrow to end both wars, the hardest part of the bargain will still be securing the signatures of those the artist left out of the painting.